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In 2 studies, the antecedents and consequences of “principled objections” to affirmative action (specific,
“race-neutral” reasons for opposing the policy) among Whites were examined. In Study 1, data from a
probability sample of Los Angeles adults indicated the following: (a) that principled-objection endorse-
ment was driven not merely by race-neutral values but also by dominance-related concerns like racism;
(b) that principled objections mediated the effects of group dominance; and (c) that education strength-
ened—rather than attenuated—the relationship between dominance-related concerns and principled
objections, whereas it left the relationship between race-neutral values and the latter essentially un-
changed. In Study 2, the education findings were conceptually replicated in a panel study of undergrad-
uates: The completion of additional years of college boosted the correlation between racism and
principled objections, whereas it had no effect on the predictive power of conservatism. These results
provide support for a general group-dominance approach, which suggests that factors like racism
continue to shape White opposition to race-targeted policies.
The political debate about racial policy in America has been
accompanied by a related controversy among students of inter-
group relations concerning the origins of White attitudes toward
policies like affirmative action (Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo,
2000). Although there are a number of approaches to this question
(e.g., Citrin & Green, 1990; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; McConahay,
1983; Sears, 1988), two have emerged as particularly important:
(a) a principled-conservatism perspective (e.g., Sniderman & Car-
mines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman, Piazza, Tet-
lock, & Kendrick, 1991), which suggests that White opposition to
affirmative action derives primarily from ideology and race-
neutral values such as self-reliance and a preference for minimal
government, particularly among the well informed and well edu-
cated and (b) a general group-dominance perspective (Federico &
Sidanius, 2000; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996), which suggests
that a desire to preserve the in-group’s privileged position contin-
ues to affect White attitudes even among educated and well-
informed citizens.
Although a number of recent studies have compared the predic-
tions made by each of these models (Federico & Sidanius, 2000;
Sidanius et al., 1996, 2000; Sniderman, Crosby, & Howell, 2000),
most of these studies have looked at only one aspect of White
opposition to affirmative action, namely its direct relationship with
some of the broader determinants of political behavior, such as
ideology and racism. What studies of the two models have failed
to provide is an examination of the specific, policy-based objec-
tions that opponents of affirmative action may have in mind when
they think about the policy, how these considerations may figure
into the reasoning chains that connect generalized attitudes like
conservatism and racism with people’s assessment of the policy, or
how their role may vary with education. In this article, we attempt
to fill this gap by providing a more sophisticated comparison of the
two models than previous work has allowed—one that takes into
account the role played by these specific policy beliefs.
The Principled-Conservatism Perspective
In light of the trend toward increased racial tolerance in the
present era (e.g., Schuman et al., 1997; Sears, 1988), the
principled-conservatism perspective suggests that racism and other
dominance-oriented motives are no longer the primary antecedents
of White attitudes toward race-targeted policies. Instead, propo-
nents of this model suggest that “the contemporary argument over
race is, at its core, a political argument,” in which policy disputes
“are given their fundamental shape by the institutions of the party
system and the ideological contours of the larger American polit-
ical landscape” (Sniderman et al., 2000, p. 276). Thus, political
values, rather than racism, now provide the primary framework
within which racial policies are understood and evaluated. As
such, proponents of this model suggest that White opposition to
race-targeted policies should be understood mainly in terms of
ideology, concerns about fairness, and support for individualistic
values. As Sniderman and Carmines (1997) have argued,
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488a primary basis for the one-sided opposition to affirmative action
which involves preferential treatment or explicit quotas is the belief
that it is not fair to hire people for jobs or grant them admission to
schools because they belong to a particular social group and not
because they are the most qualified. (p. 33)
Accordingly, proponents of this model have argued that racism and
other dominance-oriented attitudes should not predict opposition
to affirmative action once the effects of conservatism and other
race-neutral political values are accounted for and that support for
these values should not be associated with stronger racial biases
(Sniderman & Carmines, 1997). Support for this argument comes
from studies indicating that anti-Black affect is only weakly re-
lated to conservatism and opposition to race-targeted policies
(Sniderman, Brody, & Kuklinski, 1984; Sniderman et al., 1991),
and from survey-based experiments suggesting that conservatives
are not more likely to deploy a double standard against Blacks in
the allocation of aid to disadvantaged members of various groups
(Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993;
Sniderman et al., 1991, 2000).
To be sure, the principled-conservatism model does not suggest
that opposition to affirmative action will be completely indepen-
dent of racism. However, it does contend that relationships of this
sort are more likely to be found among the poorly educated
(Sniderman et al., 1991). Because these individuals lack the so-
phistication necessary for the understanding of abstract ideological
concepts and the formally-egalitarian ethos of American political
culture, their racial-policy attitudes and their general orientation
toward politics should be more heavily colored by factors like
racial animus. In contrast, the knowledge possessed by well-
educated respondents should allow them to frame their policy
attitudes in terms of abstract principles and provide them with an
awareness of the tolerant norms at the heart of the American creed,
attenuating the impact of racism and crude judgments about the
interests of one’s in-group (Sniderman, Hagen, Tetlock, & Brady,
1986; Sniderman et al., 1991; see also Campbell, Converse, Miller,
& Strokes, 1960; Lipset, 1960; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Selznick
& Steinberg, 1969). According to the principled-conservatism
perspective, it is these individuals who should most clearly per-
ceive the essential independence of racism and values like conser-
vatism. Thus, for example, Jacoby (1994) argued that
Education also plays an important part in determining attitudes, but
not simply because more education correlates with less racial preju-
dice: more educated whites are also more influenced by political
ideas, thus amplifying the role of ideology and diminishing the rele-
vance of race per se [italics added]. (p. 37)
Consistent with this reasoning, Sniderman and colleagues (Snider-
man & Piazza, 1993; Sniderman et al., 1991) have found that
college-educated conservatives are not more likely than college-
educated liberals to offer greater support for government guaran-
tees of equal opportunity for women than for Blacks, although both
conservatives and liberals among the poorly educated tend to care
less about equal opportunity for Blacks.
The General Group-Dominance Perspective
A very different perspective on the interface between racism,
ideology, and affirmative action is provided by what has been
referred to as the general group-dominance approach (e.g., Fed-
erico & Sidanius, 2000; Sidanius et al., 1996, 2000). Although this
approach has taken a number of specific forms, they all share a
basic set of assumptions, including the following ideas: (a) that
societies tend to be organized as hierarchies of groups differing in
power and status, (b) that politics is a competition between groups
over scarce material and symbolic resources, and (c) that dominant
groups often rely on a variety of collective representations (e.g.,
racism, individualism) to legitimize the disproportionate allocation
of resources to members of dominant groups and thereby reinforce
group inequality (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).
1 These assumptions
lead to predictions that differ considerably from those suggested
by the principled-conservatism model. First, rather than being an
isolated phenomenon or a mere case of negative affect toward
certain groups, racism is rooted in a basic desire for group domi-
nance that expresses itself in a variety of other forms, including
group self-interest and a general preference for hierarchical rela-
tions among social groups. More broadly, rather than being largely
orthogonal to one another, the dominance perspective suggests that
racism, political values, and opposition to affirmative action may
serve a similar purpose: the reinforcement of group-based hierar-
chies. In fact, the model suggests that the seemingly mainstream
values emphasized by the principled-conservatism approach may
simply mask desires for group dominance, serving as conduits for
the effects of the latter on policy preferences (see Sidanius &
Pratto, 2001).
This reasoning implies that racism, conservatism, and opposi-
tion to race-targeted policies should be highly correlated with one
another (Federico & Sidanius, 2000; Sidanius et al., 1996). Con-
sistent with this claim, a variety of evidence indicates that these
clusters of variables are interrelated in a number of ways. Although
conservatives may be no more likely than liberals to practice a
group-based double standard in the allocation of resources, a
sizable body of research suggests that direct measures of racism
are, in fact, strongly correlated both with opposition to affirmative
action and conservatism (for a review, see Sidanius et al., 1996,
2000).
2 Similar results are found when other dominance-related
variables, such as social dominance orientation, are substituted for
racism in analyses of the above sort (Sidanius et al., 2000; see also
Bobo, 2000; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000).
Finally, and most important, the group-dominance perspective
also takes issue with the assertion that racism, conservatism, and
opposition to affirmative action should be less strongly related
among the well-educated. Although it does not contest the well-
established finding that education appears to reduce absolute levels
of prejudice (Lipset, 1960; McClosky & Zaller, 1984), the group-
dominance model also suggests that educated individuals—who
1 Among others, these include realistic group conflict theory (see Bobo,
1983, 1988; Sherif, 1966), the group-positions model (see Blumer, 1961;
Smith, 1981), neoclassical hegemony models (see Gramsci, 1976; Marx &
Engels, 1846/1970), the racial oppression model (see Turner, Singleton, &
Musick, 1984), paternalistic-oppression models (see Jackman, 1994; see
also van den Berghe, 1967), and social dominance theory (see Sidanius,
1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).
2 Findings of this sort are also consistent with the repeated observation
that implicit appeals to racial hostility have become more and more
prominent in mainstream conservative political rhetoric since the 1960s
(see Ansell, 1997; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Murphy & Gulliver, 1971).
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the relationships among them (Bennett, 1988; Bishop, 1976; Delli
Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Stimson, 1975)—may find it easier to
connect their attitudes toward group-relevant social policies with
both the interests of their own groups and their attitudes toward the
out-groups the policies are designed to benefit (Federico & Sida-
nius, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius et al., 1996).
At one level, this prediction is consistent with the idea that the
added sophistication provided by education may simply allow
dominance-oriented members of high-status groups to dispense
with overt expressions of prejudice and deploy a subtler and more
complex defense of their groups’ interests (Jackman & Muha,
1984). More broadly, however, it is also consistent with one of the
chief findings of research on belief-system structure, namely the
finding that educated, politically-knowledgeable individuals are
typically more attuned to the implicational connections between
different sets of beliefs (Judd & Downing, 1990; Judd & Krosnick,
1989; Lavine, Thomsen & Gonzales, 1997; see also Converse,
1964; Stimson, 1975; Zaller, 1992). If the group-dominance mod-
el’s assertion that racism, conservatism, and opposition to affir-
mative action share a common function is true, then this reasoning
implies these variables should be more strongly interrelated among
educated Whites. Consistent with these arguments, several studies
have shown that both racism and other dominance-related vari-
ables (e.g., social dominance orientation [SDO]) are more strongly
related to conservatism and opposition to affirmative action among
well-educated and informed Whites than they are among poorly
educated and poorly informed Whites (Federico & Sidanius, 2000;
Sidanius et al., 1996, 2000; see also Sears, van Laar, Carillo, &
Kosterman, 1997). Thus, the group-dominance model suggests that
the effects of education may be more paradoxical than most
researchers have typically assumed, reducing absolute levels of
racism, on one hand, while simultaneously boosting the potency of
those prejudices that remain.
The Role of “Principled Objections”
to Affirmative Action
As this review suggests, research in the group-dominance tra-
dition has cast serious doubt on some of the principled-
conservatism model’s predictions about the relationships between
racism, conservatism, and opposition to race-targeted policies.
However, as we noted earlier, it is increasingly clear that these
analyses have neglected an important element of the larger belief
system behind opposition to affirmative action, namely the specific
cognitions individuals may have in mind when they think about the
policy (Bobo, 2000; Sears, Hetts, et al., 2000). Although studies
conducted by advocates of both models have focused primarily on
the relationship between predispositions like racism and conser-
vatism and opposition to race-targeted policies, a number of schol-
ars have suggested that affirmative-action attitudes may be medi-
ated by a variety of principled objections that made their initial
appearance in elite political discourse and have subsequently dif-
fused to members of the mass public (see Federico, 2000; Gamson,
1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Kinder & Sanders, 1990).
These include the following ideas: (a) that affirmative action
consists of unfair preferences, (b) that it is reverse discrimination,
and (c) that it stigmatizes the very people it aims to help (Bobo,
2000; Carmines & Merriman, 1993; Roth, 1990; Sniderman &
Piazza, 1993; Sears, Hetts, et al., 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom,
1997; see also Gamson & Modigliani, 1987).
Despite their emphasis on the broader determinants of opposi-
tion to race-targeted policies, neither theory seriously disputes the
argument that elite-derived principled objections may play an
important role in the origins of Whites’ attitudes toward the
policies. Although the role of these objections has perhaps been
more heavily emphasized by proponents of the principled-
conservatism model (e.g., Sniderman et al., 2000), theorists in the
group-dominance tradition generally do not object to the intuitive
notion that specific beliefs about affirmative action may have
important effects on attitudes toward the policy (Sidanius et al.,
2000). However, the two models do offer different predictions
about which generalized predispositions should lead individuals to
endorse principled objections in the first place. On one hand,
consistent with the idea that racism is no longer the primary force
driving Whites’ racial-policy attitudes, the principled-conserva-
tism model suggests that support for these objections will stem
largely from race-neutral political commitments. On the other
hand, although not disputing the idea that such values should be
relevant to policy-related beliefs, the dominance model implies
that principled objections may also be influenced by attitudes
linked to the maintenance of group hegemony.
Moreover, these basic predictions also suggest different medi-
ating roles for principled objections in the overall process leading
up to opposition to affirmative action. Although both models
suggest that principled objections may mediate the relationship
between generalized predispositions and affirmative-action oppo-
sition, they differ with respect to which predispositions they would
expect the objections to mediate. Consistent with the idea that
principled opposition to affirmative action is chiefly a function of
political values, the principled-conservatism model suggests that
attitudes like conservatism and individualism should be the pri-
mary ones in which effects are mediated by principled objections.
However, in line with the suggestion that ostensibly race-neutral
policy objections may in fact rationalize motives that are essen-
tially dominance-oriented (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; see also Bobo,
2000), the group-dominance approach implies that racism and
other dominance-related variables will also have a mediated effect
on opposition to affirmative action via principled objections.
Finally, both models imply that education may have important
effects on the relative importance of various antecedents of
principled-objection endorsement. However, the two models again
make very different predictions about what these effects should
look like. On one hand, consistent with the idea that education
should dampen the effects of group-oriented concerns and
strengthen people’s awareness of the incompatibility of prejudice
and the basic norms of American political culture, the principled-
conservatism model suggests that dominance-related variables
should be related to principled objections mainly among the poorly
educated. On the other hand, consistent with the notion that edu-
cation may strengthen respondents’ understanding of the common,
hierarchy-enhancing implications of racism, principled objections,
and opposition to affirmative action, the group-dominance ap-
proach suggests that the effects of racism and other dominance-
related variables should, if anything, become more pronounced
among the well-educated (e.g., Sidanius et al., 2000).
As noted earlier, issues such as these have not received a great
deal of attention. Nevertheless, recent work has begun to provide
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experimental study of students’ attitudes toward affirmative action,
Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, and Zanna (1998) found that
affirmative-action programs designed to violate certain norms (i.e.,
meritocracy and consistency of treatment) were opposed more
strongly by individuals who endorsed these norms, a result con-
sistent with principled-conservatism predictions. However, in line
with group-dominance predictions, Bobocel et al. also found that
prejudice was independently associated with program opposition,
an effect that was mediated by the tendency to perceive the
programs as justice-violating.
Unfortunately, although the Bobocel et al. (1998) study was able
to shed light on some of the issues raised by each model, it was
unable to address a number of others. For example, although
ideology and individualism have been implicated both as direct
determinants of which policy-related cognitions are salient to a
given individual (Sniderman et al., 2000) and as vehicles for the
influence of dominance-related factors (Sidanius et al., 2000; see
also Federico, 2000), their effects were not examined in this study,
leaving researchers with an incomplete look at the causal process
suggested by each model. Moreover, although the experimental
design used by Bobocel et al. did allow them to precisely gauge the
effects of specific justice-violating aspects of affirmative-action
programs, it did not permit a look at the full range of principled
objections people may have in mind when thinking about affirma-
tive action. For example, it looked only at support for one of the
elite arguments that provide the framework for principled opposi-
tion to affirmative action (i.e., its possible lack of fairness) as
opposed to concerns about reverse discrimination, minority stig-
matization, and the like (Gamson, 1992). Additionally, it was
unable to explore the cognitions individuals have in mind under
“normal” conditions, with no inducement to think about affirma-
tive action in specific terms. Finally, and most important, Bobocel
et al.’s study, which relied on cross-sectional student samples, was
unable to explore the key role of education. It is these concerns that
we attempt to address in the present study.
Overview of the Studies
In summary, rather than simply looking at the relationship
between generalized predispositions and opposition to affirmative
action, the studies reported here attempt to compare the two
models’ predictions about the role of the specific, policy-relevant
beliefs commonly thought to mediate this relationship. Perhaps
more important, they also attempt to examine their divergent
predictions about the role of education. To this end, we conducted
two studies. Our first study relied on data from White respondents
to the 1996 Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS). In this
sample, we examined the overall pattern of causal relationships
among political values, dominance-related variables, principled
objections, and opposition to affirmative action, as well as the
effects of education on the relative predictive power of race-
neutral and dominance-related variables vis-a `-vis principled ob-
jections. In our second study, we extended our investigation of the
role of education in a longitudinal direction by examining changes
in the relative importance of race-neutral and dominance-related
variables as antecedents of support for principled objections in a
sample of White students over the course of their college educa-
tion. Because we were able to track individuals’ attitudes over time
in this study, we were able to get a closer look at the paradoxical
effect of education (i.e., its tendency to reduce absolute levels of
prejudice) while increasing the predictive power of prejudice with
regard to actual racial-policy attitudes.
Study 1
Method
Respondents and Procedure
As noted above, the data for this study were taken from the 1996
LACSS. The LACSS is a large omnibus survey, conducted each spring by
the Institute for Social Science Research (ISSR) at the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA). Using a random digit dialing procedure,
the ISSR contacts a random sample of Los Angeles adults for telephone
interviews and assesses a wide assortment of variables, including general
political attitudes, racial attitudes, attitudes toward a variety of social
policies, and standard demographics. The 1996 sample consisted of 663
randomly selected adults from Los Angeles County. Of these, 206 were
White, 209 were Black, 205 were Latino, and 43 were Asian American.
Only the White respondents’ data were used.
Measures
Using items from 1996 LACSS, we operationalized eight variables:
conservatism, individualism, classical racism, group threat, social domi-
nance orientation, opposition to affirmative action, principled objections to
affirmative action, and educational attainment. A series of demographic
variables were also included in the analyses. Unless otherwise indicated,
each item used a 4-point response scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree)
t o4( strongly agree). Except for education and the demographics, all of
these measures were recoded to run from 0 to 1 prior to the analyses.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 1.
Race-Neutral Political Values
Political conservatism. This composite measure was based on two
indices: (a) respondents’ self-placement on a 5-point ideology scale, rang-
ing from 1 (strong liberal)t o5( strong conservative); and (b) a summary
index of respondents’ partisan identification, which also formed a 5-point
scale, ranging from 1 (strong Democrat)t o5( strong Republican). Both
indices were coded such that higher scores indicated greater conservatism
(  .67).
Individualism. This variable measured support for the value of self-
reliance and the belief that success is primarily a function of individual
effort. It was indexed using two items: (a) “Although there was discrimi-
nation in the past, today members of all groups have an equal opportunity
to succeed”; and (b) “Success, or one’s achievement, in American society
depends primarily on individual merit.” Higher scores indicated greater
individualism (  .67).
Group-Dominance Variables
Classical racism. This variable measured the degree to which respon-
dents exhibited “old-fashioned,” dominance-oriented prejudices toward
Blacks (see Sidanius et al., 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth,
1991). Respondents were given a list of reasons “some people give” to
explain why Blacks are worse off than Whites and asked to indicate how
much they agreed or disagreed with each. Responses to two of these
reasons were included in the scale: (a) “Because Blacks have less in-born
ability to learn” and (b) “Because most Blacks just don’t have the moti-
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indicated greater racism (  .45).
3
Group threat. This variable measured the degree to which respondents
believed that Blacks posed a threat to other groups in the competition for
valued social resources such as jobs, housing, and political power (see
Bobo, 1988, 2000). Four items were included in the scale: (a) “More good
jobs for Blacks means fewer good jobs for members of other groups”; (b)
“The more influence Blacks have in local politics, the less influence
members of other groups will have in local politics”; (c) “The more good
housing and neighborhoods go to Blacks, the fewer good houses and
neighborhoods there will be for members of other groups”; and (d) “Many
Blacks have been trying to get ahead academically at the expense of
members of other groups.” Higher scores indicated greater levels of per-
ceived threat (  .76).
Social dominance orientation. Social dominance orientation—a di-
mension reflecting the degree to which individuals prefer hierarchical
relations between groups in society—was measured using the complete
16-item Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).
Extensive psychometric work has shown this scale to be highly reliable and
valid, as well as distinguishable from related dimensions, such as right-
wing authoritarianism (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, Malle, 1994; Sidanius
& Pratto, 2001; see also Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996;
Whitley, 1999). Higher scores indicated higher SDO (  .84).
Racial Policy Measures
Opposition to affirmative action. This was measured with a single item
asking respondents to answer the following question: “Do you support or
oppose affirmative action?” Higher scores indicated greater opposition to
affirmative action.
Principled objections to affirmative action. This variable assessed the
degree to which respondents believed that a series of “principled,” race-
neutral objections to affirmative action were important to their overall
opinion on the issue. The respondents were asked to indicate how central
a series of policy considerations were to their beliefs about affirmative
action. Before they were asked about the importance of each objection,
respondents were read the following stem: “People give many reasons for
their position on affirmative action. I am going to read you some of these
reasons. For each one, please tell me how important this reason is for your
position on affirmative action.” Although respondents gave their opinions
on six considerations, only the four that dealt specifically with principled
reasons for opposing affirmative action that have become prominent in
elite discourse—and that have been picked up by opponents in the mass
public (Gamson, 1992; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; see also Roth, 1990;
Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997)—were included in the measure: (a)
“Affirmative action is reverse discrimination,” (b) “Affirmative action is
basically unfair,” (c) “Affirmative action will increase racial conflict,” and
(d) “Affirmative action just increases the idea that certain groups are not as
good as others.” Respondents rated the importance of each of these
“principled objections” on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (very important
reason)t o4( not at all an important reason). These items were reverse-
coded and then averaged; higher scores indicated that principled objections
to affirmative action were more important to respondents’ beliefs about the
issue (  .84).
Educational attainment. This was indexed using six educational cate-
gories: no high school diploma, high school graduate, some college (with
no higher degree), junior or community college degree, BA or BS degree
(with no advanced degree), and advanced degree.
Demographics. The analyses also included three demographic vari-
ables: age, gender, and income.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
The intercorrelations among the variables are shown in Table 1.
Here, there are several interesting preliminary results. First, con-
sistent with assumptions of both models, “principled-objection”
endorsement was related to affirmative-action opposition (r  .61,
p  .0001). Because both models assume that the effects of
principled objections should be proximal to those of generalized
predispositions like conservatism and racism, we also looked at
whether the relationship between the two variables remained
strong once conservatism, individualism, and the three group-
dominance variables were added to the analysis. Consistent with
this assumption, the addition of these variables only slightly re-
duced the relationship between principled objections and opposi-
tion to affirmative action (r  .50, p  .0001).
Further inspection of the coefficients in Table 1 also provides
some evidence for the group-dominance model’s assumption that
racism is essentially an expression of group dominance with close
ties to other group-interested variables. Here, it can be seen that
racism was strongly related both to group threat (r  .48, p  .01)
and to social dominance orientation (r  .44, p  .01). Moreover,
the correlation between group threat and SDO was also fairly
strong (r  .40, p  .01). Confirming this pattern of intercorre-
3 Although a reliability of .45 is relatively low in absolute terms—and in
comparison with the reliabilities for the race-neutral variables—it is not
unusual to observe reliabilities of this magnitude with short scales within
probability samples, as opposed to samples of university students (espe-
cially with regard to racial-attitude measures; see Sears et al., 1997).
Furthermore, to the extent that this low reliability is a source of bias, the
bias would go against our hypothesis, because it would actually attenuate
the correlation between racism and other variables. This is especially the
case when one remembers that the reliabilities of the race-neutral scales
were higher, reducing the likelihood of an attenuation of their effects.
Table 1
Intercorrelations for Variables From the 1996 Los Angeles County Social Survey (Study 1)
Variable MS D1234567
1. Principled objections 2.71 0.91 —
2. Political conservatism 2.98 1.04 .42 —
3. Individualism 2.88 0.84 .45 .38 —
4. Classical racism 1.73 0.66 .36 .29 .20 —
5. Group threat 1.69 0.69 .37 .20 .13
a .48 —
6. Social dominance orientation 1.56 0.46 .36 .28 .13
a .44 .40 —
7. Opposition to affirmative action 2.50 1.03 .61 .42 .27 .29 .27 .35 —
a Correlations not significant at the p  .05 level. All other correlations were significant at the p  .01 level.
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scale indicated that the three measures hung together well (i.e.,
  .71). Thus, the three group-dominance variables do appear to
form something of a unit.
Principled Objections to Affirmative Action: Antecedents
and Causal Significance
Although the above results suggest that principled objections are
a strong predictor of opposition to affirmative action, the question
of where these principled objections come from in the first place
still remains. To address this question, we estimated three regres-
sion models, in which principled objections were regressed on the
demographics, conservatism, individualism, and classical racism
(Model 1), group threat (Model 2), or SDO (Model 3). The results
of these analyses can be found in Table 2. Consistent with our
expectations based on the principled-conservatism model, conser-
vatism and individualism were significantly related to principled
objections to affirmative action in all three models (all ps  .001),
even after the effects of each group-dominance variable were taken
into consideration. However, a look at the coefficients for our three
group-dominance variables shows a pattern more consistent with
the group-dominance model: Racism (b  .29,   .20, p  .01),
group threat (b  .39,   .27, p  .001), and SDO (b  .41,  
.25, p  .001) each predicted significant variance in principled
objections to affirmative action, even after the effects of conser-
vatism and individualism were taken into account. Thus, although
race-neutral variables do have an influence on principled objec-
tions, a fact that neither model would dispute, desires for group
dominance are clearly relevant to principled objections, as propo-
nents of the dominance model have argued. Of course, this anal-
ysis of the antecedents of principled objections provides us with a
look at only one part of a much broader empirical canvas. More
precisely, the two models suggest that principled objections to
affirmative action will play different roles in the overall pattern of
relationships connecting generalized predispositions with affirma-
tive-action opposition. Although both models contend that princi-
pled objections should mediate the relationship between these
broader attitudes and opposition to affirmative action, the
principled-conservatism model suggests that principled objections
should primarily mediate the effects of race-neutral political val-
ues, whereas the group-dominance approach implies that they
should also mediate the effects of various dominance-related
motives.
In an effort to reinforce our regression results, and expand on
them by looking at the overall role played by principled objections
in the process leading up to affirmative-action opposition, we
estimated a linear structural relations (LISREL) maximum-
likelihood structural equation model (Jo ¨reskog & So ¨rbom, 1993).
In this model, conservatism, individualism, and principled objec-
tions were specified as latent factors indicated by the individual
items in each scale, whereas the single-item index of opposition to
affirmative action was included as a measured variable. Because
racism, group threat, and social dominance orientation can be
thought of as manifestations of a single underlying dimension
corresponding to desires for group dominance (Federico & Sida-
nius, 2000; Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius et al., 1996), the scales for
each these variables were used as the three indicators of a latent
group-dominance factor. Following the customary procedure (see
Jo ¨reskog & So ¨rbom, 1993), we set the metric of each latent factor
by fixing one of its loadings to 1. In the model, conservatism,
individualism, and group dominance were specified as correlated
exogenous variables, whereas principled objections and opposition
to affirmative action were regarded as endogenous variables. Con-
servatism, individualism, and group dominance were allowed to
have direct effects on principled objections, and opposition to
affirmative action was assumed to be a function of conservatism,
group dominance, and principled objections.
4
The results for this model are shown in Figure 1 with unstand-
ardized parameter estimates. On the whole, the model provided an
acceptable fit to the data, 
2(45)  55.26, p  .14, adjusted
goodness-of-fit index (AGFI)  .91. Consistent with our prelim-
inary analyses, principled objections were related to affirmative
action opposition (b  .53, p  .001), net of the effects of
conservatism and group dominance. Also, as before, we found that
the latent factors corresponding to conservatism and individualism
were both related to principled objections (b  .30, p  .10, and
b  .38, p  .01, respectively), although the effect of conservatism
was only marginal when the effects of the other variables were
4 Two additional points about the specification of this model are worth
mentioning here. First of all, although individualism was related to
affirmative-action opposition in this dataset (b  .24, p  .01), preliminary
analyses indicated that this relationship was completely mediated by prin-
cipled objections and conservatism (reducing the net relationship to non-
significance; b  .09, p  .10). Therefore, the model did not include a
direct path from individualism to affirmative-action opposition. Secondly,
on the basis of information provided by LISREL’s modification-index
feature (Jo ¨reskog & So ¨rbom, 1993), the errors for two of the indicators of
principled objections were allowed to correlate. These were the errors for
the items asking about affirmative action as “reverse discrimination” and
the likelihood that affirmative action reinforced the perception that some
groups were not as good as others; these errors correlated at   .15 (p 
.05).
Table 2
Importance of Principled Objections to Affirmative Action
Regressed on Political Conservatism, Individualism, and
Classical Racism (Model 1), Group Threat (Model 2), and
Social Dominance Orientation (Model 3; Study 1, 1996
Los Angeles County Social Survey)
Model & variable BS E B  R
2
1
Political conservatism .29*** .08 .26 .359***
Individualism .35*** .07 .32
Classical racism .29** .09 .20
2
Political conservatism .31*** .08 .27 .380***
Individualism .34*** .07 .31
Group threat .39*** .09 .27
3
Political conservatism .28*** .08 .25 .357***
Individualism .32*** .08 .29
Social dominance orientation .41*** .11 .25
Note. Bs, SEs, and cumulative R
2 statistics are from equations containing
all three predictors in each model, education, and the demographic
variables.
** p  .01. *** p  .001.
493 “PRINCIPLED OBJECTIONS” TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONconsidered. This is a result generally consistent with the
principled-conservatism model. Indeed, constraining either of
these two paths to zero produced a significant decline in model fit,

2(1)  3.15, p  .05, for conservatism; 
2(1)  8.19, p  .01,
for individualism, although only the constraint on the effect of
individualism reduced the overall fit of the model to nonsignifi-
cance (albeit just barely; i.e., 
2[46]  63.45, p  .045). However,
contrary to the assumptions of the principled-conservatism ap-
proach—but consistent with group-dominance predictions—the
estimates shown in Figure 1 also indicate that group dominance
had a considerable effect on principled objections (b  .83, p 
.001), one that was far larger than the effect of either race-neutral
factor. Consistent with this result, an additional analysis indicated
that constraining the effect of group dominance to zero produced
a significant and relatively large decline in model fit,

2(1)  12.70, p  .001, effectively reducing the overall fit of
the model to nonsignificance, 
2(46)  67.96, p  .02. Finally,
consistent with the idea that conservatism, individualism, and
various ideologies of group dominance may share common,
hierarchy-enhancing features, both conservatism and individual-
ism were significantly correlated with the group-dominance factor
(  .13, and   .10, respectively; both ps  .01). Moreover,
constraining these two covariances to zero produced a significant
decline in model fit, 
2(2)  20.28, p  .001, reducing the
overall fit of the model to nonsignificance, 
2(47)  75.54, p 
.01.
An analysis of the indirect effects of each exogenous variable on
opposition to affirmative action via principled objections rein-
forced this pattern of findings. Here, the estimates for the overall
model revealed that only one of the race-neutral variables, indi-
vidualism, had a fully significant indirect effect on opposition to
affirmative action (indirect effect [IE]  .20, p  .05). The
indirect effect of conservatism was only marginal (IE  .16, p 
.10). In contrast, group dominance had a sizable indirect effect on
affirmative action opposition (IE  .43, p  .01). As such, this
suggests that the causal process leading up to affirmative action
opposition cannot ignore the effect of dominance-related variables
on the endorsement of principled objections.
The Role of Education
Although these results are certainly instructive, they leave one
of our most important concerns—the role of education—unad-
dressed. To explore the role of this key variable, we looked at the
antecedents of principled objections to affirmative action sepa-
rately among Whites who were low and high in educational
attainment. Following a methodology used in earlier studies (e.g.,
Sidanius et al., 1996; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993), we divided the
sample into a low-education group consisting of respondents with
no college degree (n  118) and a high-education group consisting
of respondents with at least a community college degree (n  88).
For each of the three models, the principled-objections index was
then regressed separately on the demographics, conservatism, in-
dividualism, and the dominance variable included in that model. In
a further analysis, the groups were combined, and differences in
the relationship between each attitude and principled objections
across the groups were tested by examining the coefficients for the
interactions between each attitude and education.
The results of these analyses are displayed in Table 3. Looking
first at the multivariate results for the two “race-neutral” predictors
in each of the models, we find a pattern that is inconsistent with the
principled-conservatism model’s predictions about the effects of
education. Once the effects of the dominance variables are ac-
counted for, the coefficients corresponding to the relationship
between conservatism and principled objections actually appear to
become smaller as respondent education increases (b  .28 vs. b 
.17, in Model 1; b  .30 vs. b  .24, in Model 2; b  .30 vs. b 
.21, in Model 3), although the coefficients for individualism appear
to increase slightly (b  .33 vs. b  .38, in Model 1; b  .30 vs.
b  .40, in Model 2; b  .29 vs. b  .37, in Model 3). However,
Figure 1. Linear structural relations estimates for the overall causal model (Study 1, 1996 Los Angeles County
Social Survey). Dom.  dominance; Affirm.  affirmative. 
2(45)  55.26, p  .14, adjusted goodness-of-fit
index  .91. * p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
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education did not reach significance in any of the models (all ps 
.10), suggesting that the magnitude of the relationship between
each of the “race-neutral” variables and principled objections
remains essentially consistent across educational levels.
Turning to the coefficients for the group-dominance factors, we
found a pattern that was even less consistent with the principled-
conservatism model. In Model 1, we found that the net relationship
between racism and principled objections was nonsignificant
among the poorly educated (b  .13, p  .10) but highly positive
and significant among the well-educated (b  .63, p  .001).
Moreover, the difference between these coefficients was signifi-
cant (interaction b  .54, p  .01). In the case of Model 2, we
found a similar pattern: The net relationship between group threat
and principled objections is larger among the highly educated (b 
.60, p  .001) than among the poorly educated (b  .25, p  .05),
a difference that also reached significance (interaction b  .39,
p  .05). Finally, in Model 3, we found that the relationship
between SDO and principled objections was noticeably larger
among the highly educated (b  .53, p  .01) than among the
poorly educated (b  .32, p  .05), although this difference was
not significant (b  .22, p  .10).
Although these findings are informative, the comparison of
regression coefficients across groups carries with it the possibility
that the differences between the coefficients may have resulted
from higher levels of measurement error in the low-education
group (cf. Judd, Krosnick, & Milburn, 1981; Judd & Milburn,
1980). That is, the key variables in the models may have been
measured less reliably in the low-education group, artifactually
depressing the relationships between principled objections and
their antecedents (Pedhazur, 1997). To deal with this problem and
provide an overall look at the effects of education, a summary
analysis of the role of education was conducted using a series of
LISREL multigroup structural equation models (Jo ¨reskog & So ¨r-
bom, 1993). In these analyses, the causal model tested earlier was
estimated separately within the low- and high-education groups. In
three successive LISREL runs, the path from one of the three basic
predictors (i.e., conservatism, individualism, or group dominance)
to principled objections was constrained to equality across the two
groups. Like the interactions tested above, this procedure allowed
us to see whether the strength of the relationship between each
predictor and principled objections varied across the two groups.
However, because these models look at the relationship between
latent variables—assumed to reflect error-free “true scores”—
rather than measured variables, they are not faced with the problem
of differential reliability across groups (Jo ¨reskog & So ¨rbom,
1993).
The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 4 using
unstandardized parameter estimates. Looking first at the coeffi-
cients for the relationships between the two race-neutral values and
principled objections, we again found a result that is generally at
odds with the principled-conservatism perspective. More pre-
cisely, the effect of conservatism on principled objections again
appeared to decline with education: Although it was positive and
marginally significant in the low-education group (b  0.53, p 
.10), it actually became negative—although not significantly
so—in the high-education group (b  0.20, p  .10). The effect
of individualism, on the other hand, did appear to increase with
education (i.e., b  0.31, p  .10, in the low-education group vs.
b  0.54, p  .05, in the high-education group). However, as the
Table 3
Importance of Principled Objections to Affirmative Action Regressed on Political Conservatism,
Individualism, and Classical Racism (Model 1), Group Threat (Model 2), and Social
Dominance Orientation (Model 3) at Low and High Levels of Education
(Study 1, 1996 Los Angeles County Social Survey)
Model & variable
Low education (n  118) High education (n  88)
Slope test Multivariate Multivariate
Bivariate B B SE B Bivariate B B SE B B SE B
1
Conservatism .27** .28** .10 .58*** .17 .13 .09 .16
Individualism .33*** .33** .10 .56*** .38*** .11 .04 .15
Classical racism .19† .13 .11 .89*** .63*** .16 .54** .19
Adjusted R
2 .170 .424
2
Conservatism — .30** .10 — .24† .12 .03 .16
Individualism — .30** .10 — .40*** .11 .09 .15
Group threat .25* .25* .12 .77*** .60*** .14 .39* .18
Adjusted R
2 .174 .450
3
Conservatism — .30** .11 — .21 .14 .07 .17
Individualism — .29** .10 — .37** .12 .07 .16
Social dominance orientation .39** .32* .14 .76*** .53** .18 .22 .22
Adjusted R
2 .197 .337
Note. Multivariate entries for low and high education groups are taken from equations containing the three
attitudes in each model and the demographic variables. Tests of slope differences are based on the unstandard-
ized regression coefficients for each interaction term.
† p  .10. * p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
495 “PRINCIPLED OBJECTIONS” TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONnonsignificant chi-square statistics in the last column of Table 3
indicate, constraining these two relationships to equality across
groups did not significantly reduce the overall fit of the multigroup
model in either case (i.e., p  .06, and p  .09, respectively). In
contrast, the effect of group dominance on principled objections
appeared to increase markedly across the two groups: Although it
failed to reach significance at all in the low-education group
(b  0.72, p  .10), it was strong and positive in the high-
education group (b  2.92, p  .05). Moreover, as Table 3
indicates, constraining this path to equality across the two groups
did produce a significant decrement in overall fit (p  .05),
suggesting that the strength of this relationship is indeed reliably
larger in the high-education group.
5
In general, then, these results are more supportive of the general
group-dominance model. Contrary to the principled-conservatism
hypothesis, group-dominance considerations were more (rather
than less) related to the endorsement of principled objections to
affirmative action among the highly educated, even after the ef-
fects of conservatism and individualism were accounted for. More-
over, the relationship between each of the latter two variables and
principled objections did not increase with education.
Study 2
Although these results provide some insight into the dynamics
of principled opposition to affirmative action, they also have
certain limitations, particularly with regard to our key prediction
about the role of education. More precisely, our analysis of the
effects of education on the relationship between race-neutral po-
litical values, dominance-related concerns, and principled objec-
tions—as well as previous analyses of education in this area
(Sidanius et al., 1996; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993)—relied on
cross-sectional data, in which the attitudes of groups differing in
education were compared. In contrast, the longitudinal, within-
subject effects of higher education have not been examined. Nev-
ertheless, an analysis of this sort may help clarify issues that are
difficult to address using cross-sectional data. Most important,
although both perspectives suggest that changes directly associated
with the educational process should produce the shifts in attitude
organization predicted by each, comparisons of respondents dif-
fering in educational attainment give a look only at the end result
of this process; they do not allow researchers to directly trace
differences in belief organization to the educational experience.
Moreover, they do not allow researchers to deal with the possibil-
ity that other aspects of the divergent life trajectories of respon-
dents differing in educational attainment are responsible for the
differences in attitude structure predicted by each model. Finally,
given that both the principled-conservatism approach and others
have often suggested that of all educational experiences exposure
to college has perhaps the strongest effects on the development of
tolerance (Sniderman et al., 1984, 1991; Sniderman & Piazza,
1993; see also McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Selznick & Steinberg,
1969), we felt it was important to examine what happened to
attitudes during the college period in particular. In an effort to deal
with these issues, we turned to data from an ongoing panel study
of intergroup attitudes among students at UCLA, which allowed us
to directly examine changes in the relationship between race-
neutral values, group-relevant concerns, and principled objections
in the same group of individuals over several years of college.
Method
Respondents and Procedure
The data used in these analyses were collected as part of a ongoing panel
study of the development of intergroup attitudes over the course of the
college experience. In this analysis, data from only two waves were
examined. The timing of each of these panels allowed us to examine the
relationships between the variables of interest at a baseline time prior to the
college experience and at a time after which the effects of higher education
should have begun to emerge. Data for the first wave were collected in the
summer of 1996 during orientation sessions for incoming freshmen at
UCLA. During this wave, 2,157 respondents (78% of the eligible students
who attended the orientations) completed a written questionnaire asking
about a variety of social, political, and campus-related issues. This sample
consisted of 748 Whites, 68 Blacks, 255 Latinos, 753 Asian Americans,
and 333 members of other ethnic groups (e.g., Native Americans, those of
Middle Eastern descent). Of these, 44% were male and 56% were female.
Data for the second wave we examined were collected approximately 2
years later, during the spring of 1998 (at the end of the students’ sophomore
year). During this wave, 1,390 (64%) of the students from the first wave
completed telephone interviews—conducted by the Computer-Assisted
Telephone Interview unit at UCLA’s Institute for Social Science Re-
search—remeasuring many of the same variables assessed during the
earlier wave of the study.
6 Only data from the White participants who gave
complete responses to all relevant items in both waves were used, resulting
in a final sample of 372 individuals. Of these, 50% were male and 50%
were female.
5 Additional multigroup analyses indicated that none of the other paths
in the model differed significantly across the two groups (all ps  .05).
6 The second wave we examined also included a number of respondents
who were added to the study after the first wave. Because these respon-
dents did not complete the essential first-wave measures, they were ex-
cluded from the analyses.
Table 4
Multigroup Structural-Equation Analysis of the Effects of
Conservatism, Individualism, and Group Dominance on
Principled Objections to Affirmative Action at Low
and High Levels of Education (Study 1, 1996
Los Angeles County Social Survey)
Effect of
Low
education
High
education
Constrained
model

2(91) p
Conservatism on
principled objections .53† .20 113.13 .06
Individualism on
principled objections .31 .54* 110.06 .09
Group dominance on
principled objections .72 2.92* 115.08 .05
Note. Entries for the low and high education columns are unstandardized
linear structural relations parameter estimates. Entries in the 
2 column
refer to the fit of the overall multigroup model in which the indicated path
was constrained to equality across the two groups.
† p  .10. * p  .05.
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The logistics of the panel study made it difficult to obtain measures as
detailed and varied as those included in Study 1. However, we were able
to generate measures of the following: (a) political conservatism (a race-
neutral political value), (b) classical racism (a dominance-related attitude),
and (c) principled objections to affirmative action in the university context.
Political conservatism. This variable was indexed using the same two
items in each wave: (a) “How would you describe your political party
preference?” and (b) “How would you describe your general political
outlook?” Responses were given on 7-point scales, ranging from 1 (strong
Democrat or very liberal)t o7( strong Republican or very conservative).
Higher scores indicated greater conservatism (  .86, in 1996;   .54,
in 1998).
Classical racism. Two items measuring prejudice-related attitudes
were included in both waves. These were used to construct a measure of
classical racism that differed slightly from the one used in Study 1. Rather
than focusing on explanations for Black disadvantage, these items looked
at opposition to close contact with members of other ethnic groups—an
orientation that a variety of researchers have identified as a closely related
component of prejudice in its classical, “old-fashioned” form (Sidanius &
Pratto, 2001; Sidanius et al., 1996; see also Biernat & Crandall, 1999;
Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997;
Sears, 1988). These items included the following: (a) “Interethnic dating
should be avoided” and (b) “Interethnic marriage should be avoided.”
Responses were given on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly dis-
agree)t o7( strongly agree). Higher scores indicated greater racism ( 
.97, in 1996;   .95, in 1998).
Principled objections to affirmative action. Two items measuring prin-
cipled objections to affirmative action in the university context were
included in both waves: (a) “Affirmative action admits too many students
who have a low chance of academic success” and (b) “Affirmative action
stigmatizes the people it’s supposed to help.” These two items measure
concerns that have been central to recent public discourse on affirmative
action in academic contexts (e.g., Connerly, 1996; Thernstrom & Thern-
strom, 1997). Responses were given on a 7-point scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree)t o7( strongly agree). Higher scores indicated greater
endorsement of principled objections (  .71, in 1996;   .67, in 1998).
Results
Aggregate Trends: Racism, Conservatism, and
Principled-Objection Endorsement
Before the primary analyses were conducted, we computed
mean values for each variable in 1996 and 1998, and we used
paired-samples t tests to see whether the means differed from one
another. These values are shown in Table 5. As the entries in the
first two rows indicate, scores on both of the variables presumed to
drive support for principled objections—racism and conserva-
tism—declined significantly over the 2 years studied, although
this decline was more marked in the case of respondents’ racism
scores. Moreover, principled objections also declined significantly
over the course of the study, as indicated by the entries in the
bottom row of Table 5. Although a tendency toward liberalization
was thus found on all three variables, the results for racism are
particularly interesting, because they reinforce the notion that
education leads to lower absolute levels of prejudice (see Snider-
man et al., 1991; see also McClosky & Zaller, 1984). However, as
described below, the effects of the college experience on the
relationship between racism and principled objections were far less
indicative of a liberalizing tendency, suggesting that education
may strengthen the impact of racism on Whites’ policy reasoning
while simultaneously reducing absolute levels of racism.
Education and the Antecedents of Principled Objections:
A Longitudinal Analysis
To compare the relationships between principled objections and
each of our two predictors at the outset and after 2 years of college,
we tested a maximum-likelihood LISREL structural equation
model with latent factors corresponding to the 1996 and 1998
assessments of each variable; the full correlation matrix for this
analysis is provided in the Appendix. Just as the multigroup
latent-variable models tested in Study 1 allowed us to avoid the
problems potentially created by different levels of measurement
error across the two education groups, the use of latent factors in
this model allowed us to avoid problems created by different levels
of measurement error across the two panels of the study. The
overall model, along with unstandardized estimates, is shown in
Figure 2. In both waves, principled objections were assumed to be
a function of conservatism and racism. Moreover, conservatism,
racism, and principled objections after 2 years of college were
assumed to be influenced by their counterparts at the outset of
college; these relationships are indicated by the paths from each
variable in 1996 to its counterpart in 1998. Finally, to capture
cross-sectional covariance between conservatism and racism at
each stage of the students’ educational experience, the 1996 con-
servatism and racism factors were allowed to correlate, and the
disturbances for the 1998 conservatism and racism factors were
allowed to correlate as well (see Jo ¨reskog & So ¨rbom, 1993). On
the whole, the model provided a good fit to the data, 
2(45) 
119.85, p  .10, AGFI  .90.
Looking at the unstandardized parameter estimates for the rela-
tionships between the two independent variables and principled
objections in each wave, we found a pattern of results that was
largely inconsistent with the principled-conservatism model’s pre-
dictions about the effects of higher education. At the outset of
college—when abstract political beliefs should not yet be fully
developed and affective considerations like prejudice should have
greater sway—conservatism was related to principled objections
(b  .35, p  .05), whereas racism was not (b  .06, p  .10).
However, after 2 years of college—by which time the educational
process should have strengthened students’ race-neutral political
beliefs and diminished the effects of prejudicial considerations—
the effects of conservatism had actually decreased somewhat (b 
.19, p  .05), whereas the effects of racism had increased sub-
stantially (b  .30, p  .05) despite the aforementioned decline in
Table 5
Means for Each Variable in 1996 and 1998 (Study 2, University
of California, Los Angeles Panel Study of Intergroup Attitudes)
Variable
1996 1998
t(371)
a p MS DMS D
Racism 1.75 1.34 1.49 1.00 3.84 .001
Conservatism 3.67 1.59 3.55 1.58 2.22 .05
Principled objections 4.28 1.41 3.91 1.51 4.52 .001
a Pair-samples t tests on the difference between each variable’s means in
1996 and 1998.
497 “PRINCIPLED OBJECTIONS” TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONrespondents’ absolute levels of racism. Also, as one might expect,
each variable after 2 years of college was related to its counterpart
at the outset of college (b  1.05, p  .05, for conservatism; b 
.31, p  .05, for racism).
To confirm the reliability of this pattern, we reestimated the
model twice, constraining the two paths from conservatism to
principled objections to equality on the first run and the two paths
from racism to principled objections to equality on the second run.
When the relationship between conservatism and principled ob-
jections was constrained to equality across the two waves, the
overall fit of the model declined, 
2(46)  124.65, p  .0001, with

2(1)  4.80, p  .05, suggesting that the decrease in the
magnitude of this relationship over time was reliable. Moreover,
when the relationship between racism and principled objections
was constrained to equality across the two waves, the overall fit of
the model again declined significantly, 
2(46)  125.08, p 
.0001, with 
2(1)  5.23, p  .05, suggesting that the aforemen-
tioned increase in the effect of racism on principled objections was
a reliable one.
As such, this longitudinal comparison bolsters the conclusions
suggested by the cross-sectional comparison described in Study 1.
Although the completion of 2 years of college did lead to lower
absolute levels of prejudice, it also appeared to strengthen the
relationship between racism and principled objections over time,
as the group-dominance model would predict. However, contrary
to predictions made by the principled-conservatism model, higher
education did not strengthen the relationship between conserva-
tism and principled objections to affirmative action; in fact, it
appeared to weaken it. Thus, in addition to providing further
evidence for the dominance approach, these results also reinforce
the notion that education may have paradoxical effects with regard
to expressions of group dominance, reducing their overall inten-
sity, on one hand, while simultaneously boosting their impact on
policy reasoning.
General Discussion
In contrast to almost all past research in this area, rather than
being focused on the determinants of affirmative action attitudes
themselves, this study was primarily focused on the specific argu-
ments people have in mind when opposing the policy and the role
of education in determining what the antecedents of support for
these arguments are. In two studies, we examined the role of these
“principled objections” from two very different perspectives: the
principled-conservatism approach and the general group-domi-
nance approach.
Although the results of these studies lent a certain amount of
support to each perspective, most of our findings were more
consistent with the group-dominance model than the principled-
conservatism model. Consistent with what both models would
predict, our results first of all suggested that principled objections
were strongly related to actual opposition to affirmative action,
even after the effects of several broader predispositions were taken
into account. Moreover, consistent with the principled-conserva-
tism model, we found that conservatism and individualism were
independently predictive of principled objections, even after the
Figure 2. Conservatism and racism as predictors of principled objections at different stages of the college
experience (Study 2, University of California, Los Angeles Panel Study of Intergroup Attitudes). Princ. 
principled. 
2(45)  119.85, p  .10, adjusted goodness-of-fit index  .90. * p  .05.
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ever, contrary to the expectations of the principled-conservatism
model, our results indicated that the three dominance-related vari-
ables had effects of their own on principled objections. Moreover,
although a causal analysis did suggest that one of the race-neutral
variables (i.e., individualism) had an indirect effect on opposition
to affirmative action via principled objections, it indicated that
these objections serve as a pathway for the indirect effects of group
dominance as well (see also Bobocel et al., 1998).
More uniquely, our results also suggested that the predictive
power of these antecedents of principled objections varied with
education. Although education had little or no effect on the rela-
tionship between political values and principled objections to
affirmative action in our Los Angeles County sample, it did appear
to strongly increase the effects of the three group-dominance
variables. Bolstering this finding in an important way, the UCLA
panel data showed a similar pattern of results in a longitudinal
context. Whereas the relationship between conservatism and prin-
cipled objections to affirmative action actually decreased as stu-
dents completed additional years of college, the strength of the
relationship between racism and principled objections increased
over time.
7 As noted earlier, these results suggest that education
may have paradoxical effects on expressions of racism and group
dominance. On the one hand, there is a sizable body of evidence
suggesting that direct expressions of racism tend to decrease with
increasing levels of education (e.g., Kahn, 1951; Lipset, 1960;
McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Sidanius et al., 1991; Sinclair, Sidanius,
& Levin, 1998). At the same time, however, it is also now clear
that generalized predispositions (e.g., conservatism), policy-
relevant issue considerations (e.g., principled objections), and
racial-policy attitudes (e.g., opposition to affirmative action) be-
come more strongly linked to racism and other expressions of
group dominance as people become more educated. Thus, al-
though educated Whites may be less likely to possess explicitly
racist attitudes, they may also find it easier to connect the
dominance-related motives they do possess with other attitudes
(see Jackman, 1978; Jackman & Muha, 1984).
Taken together, the results of these studies both reinforce and
expand on other analyses. First of all, like earlier research (Fed-
erico & Sidanius, 2000; Sidanius et al., 1996, 2000), the findings
reported here suggest that racism and other expressions of group
dominance are clearly germane to policy-relevant attitudes and
that education strengthens this tendency. Unlike these analyses,
however, the present study also suggests that group dominance has
an important influence on even the specific, ostensibly race-neutral
policy considerations Whites have in mind when opposing policies
like affirmative action. Moreover, like important experimental
work by Bobocel et al. (1998), the analyses reported here also
suggest that these “principled” objections may in fact mediate the
relationship between prejudicial considerations and affirmative
action attitudes highlighted by these previous studies. Neverthe-
less, the studies reported here were able to go beyond this basic
finding in a number of ways, by taking into account the role of the
broader political predispositions behind the justice beliefs exam-
ined by Bobocel et al.; by examining a broader range of elite-
derived objections people may have in mind when thinking about
affirmative action; by examining principled-objection endorse-
ment under baseline conditions in which respondents were not
encouraged to think about affirmative action in specific ways; and
perhaps most important, by exploring the moderating role of
education, a variable that has become the focal point for much of
the academic debate about the antecedents of White opposition to
policies like affirmative action. Finally, unlike almost all previous
studies in this area, our panel study provided us with a develop-
mental look at the effects of education, showing not only that the
influence of racism and other expressions of group dominance
differs across educational levels in the predicted fashion but also
that the changes that produce these differences can actually be
tracked over the course of the educational experience.
Despite the fact that these accumulated results provide a con-
sistent pattern of support for the group-dominance position, we
would like to make it clear what we are not saying. Namely, we are
not rejecting the principled-conservatism perspective in its en-
tirety. A number of its arguments have found support in studies
conducted by theorists from a variety of backgrounds (see Bobocel
et al., 1998; Sears et al., 1997; Sidanius et al., 1996, 2000). The
most important of these arguments is that White opposition to
race-targeted social policies is not merely a function of racism or
other expressions of group dominance. That is, it is clear that these
policies are also opposed for abstract reasons that have little or
nothing to do with the dominance-oriented motives highlighted
here. Moreover, it is also clear that these race-neutral motives are
often more powerfully related to affirmative-action opposition
among the educated, a finding consistent with a long line of
research on ideological constraint (see Converse, 1964; see also
Bishop, 1976; Judd & Krosnick, 1989; Stimson, 1975; Zaller,
1992).
Nevertheless, we still believe that the principled-conservatism
approach suffers from a number of serious problems. These limi-
tations are not only illustrated by the fact that opposition to
affirmative action is more strongly associated with desires for
group dominance among the well-educated but also by the fact that
principled objections to affirmative action are themselves more
strongly associated with dominance-related motives among the
well-educated. These facts, taken together with the finding that
principled objections may simply serve as a conduit for the effects
of motives which are far from race-neutral, cast serious doubt on
key aspects of the principled-conservatism thesis. We submit that
rather than being opposed merely because it violates tenets of the
American creed, affirmative action is also opposed because it is
thought to endanger the continued hegemony of one group over
another and that ostensibly principled objections to the policy may
serve as a mask for the effects of this motive.
Although a broad pattern of results would thus appear to provide
support for the assumptions of the general group-dominance
model, we would also like to point out a few unresolved issues.
First of all, although we and others (e.g., Bobocel et al., 1998) have
argued that principled objections should be seen as antecedents of
opposition to the policy itself, there is good reason to suspect that
the causal arrow may point in the opposite direction as well. That
7 Moreover, this residual effect of higher education is even more im-
pressive when one remembers that the respondents—all high school grad-
uates—were already more thoroughly educated at the outset of the study
than many of the individuals typically categorized as “poorly educated” in
previous studies (e.g., those without high school degrees; see Sidanius et
al., 1996; Sniderman et al., 1991).
499 “PRINCIPLED OBJECTIONS” TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONis, once people have decided they are against affirmative action,
for whatever reason, they may then fall back on “principled”
arguments found in elite discourse to justify this a priori position.
Our evidence does not exclude the possibility of such effects,
which may in fact coexist with the ones described above. How-
ever, measures of both affirmative action and principled objections
were available only in our cross-sectional dataset from Study 1,
which made it impossible to disentangle these two causal scenarios
from one another (which would require a cross-lagged analysis of
longitudinal data on both measures; see Markus, 1979). As such,
additional data will be required before this question can be ade-
quately addressed.
Moreover, as we have noted elsewhere (Federico & Sidanius,
2000), although there is now consistent evidence that dominance
motives strongly predict opposition to race-targeted policies
among the educated and other sophisticated portions of the mass
public, this moderating effect has yet to be tested using the
population of “true political elites,” including government offi-
cials, activists, journalists, and academics (cf. Converse, 1964;
McClosky & Zaller, 1984). As such, it is still possible that the
principled-conservatism perspective might apply in this very select
group of political actors, among which principled opposition to
affirmative action appears to have resonated strongly (e.g., Con-
nerly, 1996; Glazer, 1975; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997).
These issues and others await the attention of researchers.
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Appendix
Correlations Between Latent-Variable Indicators, Study 2
Latent indicator 12345678 9 1 0 1 1 1 2
1996 measures
1. Party identification —
2. Ideology .77 —
3. Interethnic dating .06
a .08
a —
4. Interethnic marriage .09
a .11 .94 —
5. AA admits unprepared students .43 .33 .13 .14 —
6. AA stigmatizes recipients .33 .33 .01
a .06
a .55 —
1998 measures
7. Party identification .80 .73 .06
a .10
a .30 .25 —
8. Ideology .55 .60 .06
a .08
a .16 .18 .62 —
9. Interethnic dating .11 .07
a .38 .40 .10
a .03
a .10
a .13 —
10. Interethnic marriage .14 .13 .36 .43 .14 .07
a .15 .12 .91 —
11. AA admits unprepared students .34 .32 .12 .14 .42 .21 .33 .34 .26 .27 —
12. AA stigmatizes recipients .34 .31 .00
a .04
a .34 .33 .32 .35 .18 .18 .50 —
Note. AA  affirmative action.
a Correlations not significant at the p  .05 level.
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